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An Augmented Buck-Passing
Account of Reasons and Value:
Scanlon and Crisp on What
Stops the Buck
P H I L I P C O O K
London School of Economics
Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon’s buck-passing account of
value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons
and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s dual role of
reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it
fails. Crisp’s reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is
buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal
properties, and that Scanlon is ambiguous about whether the formal property of a reason
can stop the buck. Drawing from Wallace, I respond to Crisp’s reasons and the good
objection by developing an augmented buck-passing account of reasons and value, where
the buck is passed consistently from the formal properties of both to the substantive
properties of considerations and evaluative attitudes. I end by describing two unresolved
problems for buck-passers.
INTRODUCTION
According to Scanlon’s buck-passing view, goodness is a formal higher-
order property constituted by the reasons that count in favour of
substantive first-order properties. A persistent criticism of Scanlon,
inspired by Roger Crisp’s work, is that buck-passing misrepresents the
relationship between reasons and goodness.1 This misrepresentation
of properties argument can be characterized in two objections: the
wrong kind of reasons objection; and what I shall call the reasons and
good objection. I will here defend the buck-passing view from both
arguments. I begin with a discussion of the wrong kind of reasons
objection. In section 1, I argue that the state-given reasons/object-given
reasons solution is unsuccessful. The reasons for its failure point to a
more promising solution: Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s dual
role of reasons argument. In section 2, I argue that the dual role of
reasons argument succeeds even where its authors claim it fails. In
section 3, I consider the reasons and the good objection. I argue that
Crisp’s objection conflates the distinction between general and formal
1 See Roger Crisp, ‘Review of Kupperman, Value . . . and What Follows’, Philosophy 75
(2000), pp. 458–92, and Roger Crisp, ‘Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification:
How to Avoid Passing the Buck’, Analysis 65 (2005), pp. 80–5.
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properties. However, Crisp’s objection to the buck-passing nature of
formal properties points to a problem in Scanlon’s account that is
caused by an ambiguity in Scanlon’s argument regarding the buck-
stopping nature of reasons. This ambiguity suggests that the formal
notion of a reason can be buck-stopping, despite Scanlon’s claim that
goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. In section 4, I
adjust Scanlon’s argument in order to remedy this ambiguity. Following
a suggestion by R. Jay Wallace, I argue that Crisp’s objection can
be met by augmenting Scanlon’s buck-passing account of goodness
with a buck-passing account of reasons. Whilst this augmented buck-
passing account may provide a response to Crisp’s reasons and the
good objection, I end in section 5 by pointing to two outstanding
problems with buck-passing that require resolution if any buck-passing
argument is to succeed.
1. WRONG KINDS OF REASONS: AGAINST THE
STATE-GIVEN/OBJECT-GIVEN REASONS SOLUTION
The wrong kind of reasons criticism suggests that the buck-passing
relationship creates strange paradoxes in the relationships between
what we value and the reasons we have. Roger Crisp has given a
well-known example of this argument that has become a focus of the
wrong kind of reasons problem. ‘Imagine that an evil demon will inflict
severe pain on me unless I prefer this saucer of mud; that makes the
saucer of mud well worth preferring. But it would not be plausible to
claim that the saucer of mud’s existence is, in itself, valuable.’2 Philip
Stratton-Lake has recently employed a distinction between state-given
and object-given reasons in order to resolve this apparent paradox.3 I
will outline why this defence is unsuccessful, as the source of its failure
points towards a more promising solution.
Stratton-Lake introduces the distinction between state-given and
object-given reasons in defence of buck-passing because it distinguishes
two sources of reasons in separate properties: the property of a desire
for a saucer of mud that will save me from pain (P) and its associated
state-given reason; and the property of an object the desire for which
will shield me from pain (P′) and its associated object-given reason.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen object that this distinction does
not solve the wrong kind of reasons problem because the properties P
and P′ correspond such that there is no significant distinction between
state-given and object-given reasons. To insist otherwise is to be
2 Crisp, ‘Review of Kupperman’, p. 459.
3 Philip Stratton-Lake, ‘How to Deal with Evil Demons: Comment on Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-Rasmussen’, in Ethics 115 (2005), pp. 788–98.
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profligate with properties. Stratton-Lake responds that the distinction
between the desire as the ground of the reason in P and the object
desired as the ground of the reason in P′ is such that the ‘corresponding
property [P′] simply reaffirms the presence of the state-given reason.
It does not provide a further object-given reason. It merely tells us
that the property of the desire is a reason. So a profligate ontology
does not undermine the intuitive view about the reason-giving fact or
property.’4 In other words the distinction between properties P and
P′ and their associated reason is sufficient to distinguish a reason
in favour of a desire from a reason in favour of an object. Thus the
apparent wrong kind of reason is a reason in favour of a desire for an
object and not the object itself, and therefore not a reason of the wrong
kind.
However, this does not seem to meet Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen’s objection. For Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, the
state-given reason is constituted by the property of a desire (a desire
for a saucer of mud will save me from pain – P), whereas the object-given
reason is constituted by the property of an object (an object the desire
for which will shield me from pain – P′). The wrong kind of reasons
problem still obtains as although there are two different properties
that constitute reasons (P and P′), these properties correspond such
that the saucer of mud is included as the intentional object of the state-
given reason and is of value therefore on the buck-passing account.
There may be two distinct properties, but Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen’s correspondence point is that the state-given reason must
include the properties of the saucer of mud as the intentional object
of the attitude (the preference for the saucer of mud that will allow
me to avoid pain), and the object-given reason is constituted by the
properties of the saucer of mud in the intentional relation of being an
object of a evaluative attitude (the saucer of mud the preference for
which will allow me to avoid pain). Stratton-Lake’s response does not
succeed because whilst he claims that it is ‘A’s desire that will shield
A from pain’, he must mean that it is in fact ‘A’s desire for the saucer
of mud that will shield A from pain’ and not simply the phenomenon
of ‘A desiring’. Therefore, the wrong kind of reasons criticism persists
because the properties of the saucer of mud are included in the state-
given reason, and consequently the saucer of mud seems of value on
buck-passing terms. The correspondence between the properties of the
saucer of mud in the state-given and object-given reasons prevents
this distinction from rebutting the wrong kind of reasons criticism.
The solution from the distinction between state-given and object-given
4 Stratton-Lake, ‘How to Deal with Evil Demons’, p. 93.
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reasons is unsuccessful, and the wrong kind of reason objection drawn
from Crisp remains.
2. WRONG KIND OF REASONS: IN DEFENCE OF THE
DUAL ROLE OF REASONS SOLUTION
We have just seen that a distinction between state-given and object-
given reasons fails to refute the wrong kind of reasons objection because
there is no significant distinction between two properties providing
different reasons. Rather than posit two properties that have reasons
that count in favour of them, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s
alternative solution is a dualist view of reasons that count in favour
of a single property. Therefore we retain the strategy of the object-
given and subject-given reasons argument of making a distinction
between two kinds of reasons, but avoid the mistake of positing
two different properties as the source of these reasons. However,
whilst Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen argue that this is the most
promising solution available, they believe that this too fails to provide a
complete response. I believe that Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen
are unduly pessimistic.
According to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s dual view of
reasons, a property can provide a justification for an agent having a
reason in favour of an object, and feature in the intentional content of
a reason as the basis for the reason. For example: a person’s honesty
provides a justification for admiring the person, and is the basis for the
admiration of the person. This seems to foil the wrong kind of reason
objection of the evil demon who will inflict severe pain on me unless I
prefer a saucer of mud, because preferring the saucer of mud provides a
justification for having a reason to prefer the evil demon. However, the
saucer of mud is not the basis for the reason; the basis for the reason
is the evil demon’s threat. The properties of the saucer of mud do not
therefore feature in the reasons in a way that the wrong kind of reason
objection suggests.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s sticking point with this dual
role of right reasons is the case of an evil demon who will punish you
unless you admire him on the basis of his determination to punish him.
In this case, the property of the determination to punish features in the
reasons in the right way in both roles: it justifies admiring the demon,
and it is the basis of the reason to admire. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen claim that their dual view of right reasons cannot escape
this wrong kind of reason variation.
In defence of the dual role of reasons view, we should first point out
that this objection to Scanlon’s buck-passing account might not obtain,
given his exclusionary view of reasons. For Scanlon, certain reasons
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are excluded from consideration by other reasons in a deliberation.
‘The reason-giving force of C not only competes with that of D; it
urges that D lacks force altogether (at least in the given context).
Often, our judgment that a certain consideration is a reason builds
in a recognition of restrictions of this kind at the outset.’5 The reason
to admire the evil demon on the basis of his determination to punish
you is excluded by other reasons, such as the reasons against admiring
undeserved punishment. But the exclusionary view of reasons may not
provide a complete rebuttal, because as a further variation, Rabinowicz
and Rønnow-Rasmussen suggest that a masochistic person may indeed
admire the demon because of his determination to punish.
This variation of the wrong kind of reasons objection may be read
in three ways: first, that the person finds pleasure in punishment;
second, that the person finds pleasure in pain; and third, that the
person admires the demon because of his determination. I will argue
that each of the three wrong kind of reasons problems can be resolved,
and therefore that Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s solution is
more effective than they claim. We will deal with each variation on the
wrong kind of reason objection in turn.
a. Punishment
In the case of the person who finds pleasure in punishment, we may
question whether the masochist has understood properly the reasons
that count in favour of punishment, and indeed whether they have
understood the very notion of punishment itself. If punishment is
(at least in part) retributive, then the reasons for punishment must
necessarily include retribution of a legal/moral transgression. If the
reasons in favour of the determined evil demon are the masochist’s
masochism and not the masochist’s moral/legal transgression, then
these reasons cannot be in favour of punishment because a necessary
condition of punishment (retribution of transgression) does not exist.
Therefore, the wrong kind of reason objection does not apply because
punishment provides neither the ground nor the justification for any
reasons of the masochist. Masochists qua masochists are not punished;
masochists qua transgressors are punished. This objection relies on
the masochists’ masochism and not their transgression, and therefore
it does not produce a wrong kind of reasons objection to the dual role
of reasons view.
b. Pain
However, the masochist may believe there to be reasons counting in
favour of the pain caused by the evil demon’s action. If this is the case,
5 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), p. 51.
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then it seems we are no longer dealing with the wrong kinds of reason
objection, because the determination to inflict pain is precisely what
is of value to the masochist. The wrong kind of reasons objection only
holds if there is a reason in favour of an object that is not of value. In this
version of the masochism objection, the pain caused by the determined
demon is precisely what is of value to the masochist. The wrong kind of
reason objector may reply that this merely begs the question, because
whilst the masochist has reasons counting in favour of admiring an
evil demon on account of the demon’s determination to inflict painful
punishment, such a determined evil demon is not of value. But in the
case of the true masochist, such a determined evil demon is of value, at
least instrumentally, to the production of the enjoyment of punishment.
The wrong kind of reason objector must claim that there is an account
of the source of value that explains why the masochist is, in this case,
wrong. This might indeed be forthcoming, but it will not be established
on the basis of this variation of the wrong kind of reason complaint
against buck-passing, as there is no wrong kind of reason present here.
The wrong kind of reason objection relies on a reason counting in favour
of a property that is not of value, but on this reading pain is not shown
to be non-valuable. Therefore the dual role of reasons solution is not
defeated by the pain variation.
c. Determination
Can the attitude of determination be good in itself? Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-Rasmussen’s most serious worry with their own solution seems
to be the case of a person who admires the evil demon’s determination.
However, we may question whether determination is a property that
can have reasons that count in favour of it in the way supposed by
this case. Determination is a quality of an approach to a task. The
reasons that count in favour of determination will be partly constituted
by the task, the approach to which determination is a quality of. Our
attitudes towards determination to complete a task depend, in part, on
the nature of the task. Without a specification of the task determination
is shown towards, we cannot specify fully the reason to admire it, and
therefore whether it is indeed admirable. Therefore, the wrong kind
of reason objection would not apply in this instance, because there is
not a fully specified reason to be of either the right or wrong kind.
Consequently, determination cannot be of value in itself. When fully
specified, determination may be of non-moral value (e.g. the pursuit
of intellectual excellence or physical beauty); moral value (e.g. the
pursuit of the living together in unity on contractualist grounds); or
immoral disvalue (e.g. the pursuit of underserved painful punishment).
The reasons that feature in a contractualist buck-passing account of
goodness are constrained by reasonable rejection. As determination
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requires a specification of its objective, determination could only be good
if the reasons in its favour are allowed by contractualist justification.
If the determination is towards an objective that is not disallowed on
contractualist grounds, then its reasons are right reasons. Therefore,
it does not generate the wrong kind of reasons problem in Rabinowicz
and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s dualist view of right reasons as they suggest.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s criticism of their own dual role
of reasons succeeds where they claim it fails. The dual role of reasons
does indeed refute the seemingly persistent problem of the wrong kind
of reasons objection.
3. REASONS AND THE GOOD
We identified two objections to Scanlon’s buck-passing arguments
drawn from Roger Crisp: the wrong kind of reasons objection, and
the reasons and the good objection. Crisp states the reasons and the
good objection in reference to Scanlon’s example of a pleasant beach,
where Scanlon holds that a beach’s goodness provides no reason in its
favour, rather its being pleasant provides a reason which constitutes
value as a formal higher-order property. Crisp criticizes this account as
misrepresenting the phenomenology of value. To clarify his objection,
Crisp provides an example with the use of an analogy between the
structure of causal explanation and of normative justification. He
imagines a case where Arun, Belinda and Cara are standing around a
burning tank of petrol. We ask for a full explanation of the scene: Arun
replies that Cara threw a burning object into the tank, while Belinda
replies that Cara threw a lighted taper into the tank. Crisp argues
that on a buck-passing view, we should reject Arun’s explanation, and
accept Belinda’s.6 However, Crisp argues that the two explanations are
equally valid, but one is simply more specific than the other. Crisp
argues that explanations of value possess a similar structure, and that
buck-passing rejects explanations of value based on general reasons,
because general reasons are not buck-stopping. However, it seems to
me that Scanlon’s buck-passing argument does not claim that general
reasons cannot stop the buck. The relevant distinction for buck-passing
is between formal and substantive, and not specific and general.
The difference between general/specific and formal/substantive seems
conflated in Crisp’s objection.
a. Substantive reasons and the general/specific distinction
According to Crisp’s reasons and the good objection, Scanlon’s buck-
passing argument holds that general reasons, such as Arun’s, cannot
6 Roger Crisp, ‘Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification’, p. 84.
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stop the buck because only first-order substantive reasons counting
in favour of objects are buck-stopping. Crisp argues this because
he reads Scanlon’s buck-passing argument as describing value as
the general property of considerations counting in favour of objects.
But on the burning tank of petrol example, a buck-passing account
would accept both Belinda and Arun’s explanations because both are
substantive. Both explanations are substantive because they refer
to the particular properties that caused the combustion of the tank
of petrol. It is certainly the case that there are differing degrees
of generality in the explanations, but they both include reference
to the substantive cause of the fire. That buck-passing allows for
both general and specific descriptions of substantive reasons is clear
from an example of value employed by Scanlon. He argues that the
pleasantness of a beach is a substantive reason that counts in its
favour, and therefore stops the buck. The pleasantness of a beach is
a general yet substantive description of certain of its more specific
substantive properties, including its warmth, cleanliness, location,
and so on. From this example we can see that Scanlon’s buck-
passing argument does not claim that the buck is passed from general
to specific properties. Rather, the buck is passed from formal to
substantive properties. Crisp’s reasons and the good objection therefore
seems to conflate the distinction between formal and general, and
misrepresent the distinction in buck-passing between general/specific
reasons and formal/substantive. Both general and specific reasons
can be substantive, as we have shown with the burning tank of
petrol and the pleasant beach example above. But only substantive
reasons and the objects they count in favour of can be buck-
stopping.
This response may be charged with begging the question, however,
as it is the formality of the property of goodness, and therefore its
inability to stop the buck, that is precisely at issue. Crisp may happily
accept that Scanlon’s buck-passing argument assigns buck-stopping
substance to both general and specific reasons, whilst continuing to
object to the basic buck-passing claim that goodness and value cannot
stop the buck in virtue of their formality. What is the nature of the
formality of goodness and value such that it cannot stop the buck?
We will see that there is an ambiguity in Scanlon’s original account
of the buck-passing nature of formal properties. On Scanlon’s original
presentation it is ambiguous whether the formal property of being a
reason can be buck-stopping. If the formal property of being a reason
can stop the buck, then the argument that goodness is buck-passing
in virtue of its formality seems threatened. Once this ambiguity is
resolved, we will be able to respond to Crisp’s reasons and the good
objection.
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b. Formality and Buck-Stopping
Crisp’s reasons and the good objection disputes that goodness and value
are formal properties, and that as such they cannot stop the buck. What
is the nature of this formality? On Scanlon’s original presentation, if we
ask someone why she visited the beach, she may answer in substantive
terms: ‘because it was warm and clean’, or ‘because it was pleasant’. As
described in the previous section, these answers are specific and general
substantive answers. Substantive reasons refer to the substantive
properties of the object (in more specific or more general terms). On
Scanlon’s original formulation, goodness and value are formal because
they simply describe the relationship between objects and the reasons
that count in their favour. The substantive content of the normative
reasons counting in favour of objects stops the buck; the formal property
of goodness and value merely refers to the relationship between an
object and a consideration counting in its favour. On Scanlon’s view
of reasons as primitive, a reason is a consideration that counts in
favour of an object. Therefore, reasons must include the substantive
consideration and the object of which it counts in favour. The formality
of goodness and value must therefore omit this content, and therefore
their formality consists in their reference to the relationship of counting
in favour of considerations and objects. In other words, when the
explanation refers to considerations and objects it is substantive; when
an explanation refers to the relationship of counting in favour, it is
formal. Thus, Scanlon’s explanation of why goodness and value cannot
stop the buck is that they lack reference to any substantive content
of reasons or the objects they count in favour of, and refer only to
the relationship of counting in favour. However, as R. Jay Wallace has
pointed out, there are two problems with this account of the formality
of goodness and value.7 These problems concern the nature of the
properties and the nature of the reasons that are meant to be the
substantive buck-stopping properties.
First, on the original presentation of the buck-passing argument,
Scanlon took the view that the properties that had reasons counting
in their favour were natural properties. He gave the examples of the
pleasantness of the beach, and the light that is cast on the illness
of cancer by scientific research.8 However, Wallace argues that these
properties include evaluative elements. The pleasantness of the beach
and the knowledge instrumental to health have reasons in their favour
because of the value conferred on these objects. If these first-order
properties can include evaluative elements, then Scanlon’s original
7 R. Jay Wallace, ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism’, Ethics 112, (2002), pp. 429–70.
8 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 97.
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distinction between the buck-passing formality of goodness and value,
and the buck-stopping substantiveness of natural objects and the
reasons that count in their favour, cannot hold. In response to Wallace’s
criticism regarding natural properties, Scanlon has accepted Wallace’s
point and revised his view in such a way that first-order properties may
be evaluative.9
A second problem with Scanlon’s original account of the buck-passing
nature of goodness and value concerns the relationship between
reasons and values. Wallace points out that on Scanlon’s account
‘what is at issue is the explanatory priority of reasons vis-a`-vis values,
or (as we might put it) of the normative vis-a`-vis the evaluative’.10
The formality of goodness and value in part consists in the buck-
stopping nature of reasons (and the objects in which they count in
favour). However, it is unclear why a reason is buck-stopping whilst
the evaluative properties of goodness and value are not. When asked
‘why did you visit the beach?’, two people may respond ‘because I find
beaches relaxing’, or ‘because I had reason to visit the beach’. It seems
as though both answers should stop the buck, according to Scanlon’s
original argument, because normative reasons (and the objects in which
the count in favour) are buck-stopping whilst goodness and value
are not. This is the sense in which Wallace describes the normative
as having priority over the evaluative. But whilst the explanation
‘I visited the beach because I had reason to’ is not tautologous, it
certainly seems formal according to Scanlon’s criteria of formality we
established earlier. This explanation refers to the relationship of a
consideration counting in favour of an object, and not to the substance
of the consideration itself. If it is the formality of goodness and value
that prevent them from stopping the buck, then it cannot be that the
buck is passed simply to reasons (and the properties in which they
count in favour), because the formal property of reasons is incapable of
stopping the buck on the very same grounds as the formal property of
goodness and value.
In order to defend the argument that goodness and value are
buck-passing in virtue of their formality, we need to clarify the
formal/substantive distinction, and how it relates to reasons and
values. The clarification presented here is prompted by Wallace’s
remark that ‘a buck-passing account can with equal plausibility be
formulated for the case of reasons for action’.11 I describe this as an
augmented buck-passing view of reasons and value.
9 T. M. Scanlon, ‘Reason, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin,
and Deigh’, Ethics 112 (2002), p. 513.
10 Wallace, ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism’, p. 447.
11 Wallace, ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism’, p. 446.
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4. AN AUGMENTED BUCK-PASSING ACCOUNT OF
REASONS AND VALUE
On the augmented buck-passing view I propose, the buck is passed
from both the formal evaluative property of goodness and the formal
normative property of a reason, to the substantive properties of objects
and the substantive considerations and evaluative attitudes that count
in their favour. This augmented buck-passing account of reasons and
value employs the distinction between reasons as intentional-action-
related, and values as evaluative-attitude-related. This distinction
allows us to distinguish the kinds of responses required from agents
in favour of objects. On this augmented buck-passing view, objects can
have both substantive evaluative attitudes and substantive intentional
actions counting in their favour. We should not, as Scanlon does,
describe this solely as a buck-passing argument about value. We should
instead re-describe the buck-passing view as concerned with both the
formal properties of reasons as considerations counting in favour of
objects, in addition to value as a formal property of evaluative attitudes
counting in favour of objects. Buck-passing requires this redescription
and augmentation, because on Scanlon’s original view, it is claimed
that goodness cannot stop the buck in virtue of its formality, whilst on
this same view the buck is stopped by the formal notion of a reason
counting in favour. Therefore, for the buck-passing thesis that formal
properties cannot be buck-stopping to be preserved, we must add the
view that the formal property of a reason counting in favour must be
buck-passing in addition to the formal property of goodness and value.
The augmented buck-passing argument adds the distinction between
reasons as intentional-action-related and value as evaluative-attitude-
related, to provide a more consistent buck-passing view: the buck is
passed from both the formal properties of a reason and goodness, to
the substantive properties of considerations and evaluative attitudes
that count in favour of objects. We replace Scanlon’s view that the
normative is prior to the evaluative, with the view that the substantive
is prior to the formal. Formality is therefore uniformly buck-passing
on the augmented buck-passing view, whilst it was only partially buck-
passing on Scanlon’s original view.
We may explicate my version of this argument with the example of
a piece of music. A piece of music has certain properties related to,
inter alia, structure, expression, harmony, melody, and rhythm. These
properties at once provide specific reasons, and require appropriate
evaluative responses. We have reason to listen to the music carefully,
to listen often, to study it and learn about it, to promote its qualities to
others, and to listen to it instead of inferior pieces of music. These are
the specific reasons, attached to its first-order substantive properties.
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The music will also require certain evaluative responses from us. We
will admire it, respect it, find it beautiful, and treasure it. These are
the specific evaluations that are attached to its empirical properties.
On my augmented buck-passing account, the buck is passed from both
the higher-order properties of a reason and value onto the substantive
lower-order properties of the object and specific reasons and evaluations
that count in favour of them.
Scanlon presented his buck-passing account of value partly in terms
of the promising response it seemed to offer to G. E. Moore’s open-
question argument. The buck-passing view attempted to avoid the
problem of claiming that the good provided a reason. On Scanlon’s
original formulation, and on our augmented formulation, this problem
is avoided, because we do not claim that the property of good provides
any (further) property that counts in favour of the object under
consideration. However, on our re-characterization of the buck-passing
argument, we have now introduced an extra step by claiming that the
normative status of being a reason is as formal and second-order as
the evaluative status of being of value. It is redundant to claim that
the fact that there is a reason to φ provides a (further) reason to φ.
The buck should be passed from the formal properties of reasons and
value, to the substantive considerations and evaluations that count in
favour of objects, rather than from the formal notion of value to the
equally formal notion of a reason, as suggested by Wallace’s notion of a
buck-passing account of reasons for action.12
On this view, substantive properties ground the reasons and
evaluations that together constitute our intentional actions. The formal
properties of a reason and value are descriptive of the relationship
between these substantive properties and the first-order substantive
properties of the objects in which they count in favour. Scanlon seems
to accept that the buck is passed from the formal properties of value
and reason, to the substantive first-order properties of the object.
The formal second-order properties do not add anything evaluative or
normative to the reasons that there are. The first-order substantive
properties of the beach give us reasons because of their particular
properties. These particular, concrete properties are the locus of our
reasons. On the augmented buck-passing view, the concept of value is
formal, just as in the original buck-passing account, but so is the concept
of a reason. The buck is not passed from the evaluative notion of value
and goodness to the normative notion of rightness or wrongness. In
this way, we may retain the buck-passing move of rejecting value as
a source of reasons, but extend this rejection to the notion of a reason
12 Wallace, ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism’, pp. 446–7.
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as a buck-stopper. Scanlon’s original buck-passing account stated that
the property of value does not provide reasons. Instead, reasons are
provided by lower-order substantive properties of objects, and the
property of value is a formal, higher-order property that is constituted
by reasons counting in favour of something. On our augmented buck-
passing account, both the property of being of value and the property of
being a reason are higher-order formal properties. The buck is passed
from them onto lower-order evaluative and normative properties.
Can this augmented buck-passing account respond adequately to
Crisp’s reasons and the good criticism? Crisp’s objection centred on
the plausibility of the buck-passing move from the formal properties
of goodness and value to the substantive properties of reasons and the
objects in which they count in favour.
On Scanlon’s original account, goodness and value were incapable
of stopping the buck because of their formality, and so the buck was
passed to substantive properties of objects and the reasons that count
in their favour. However, we saw that in this argument goodness and
value could not be buck-passing in virtue of their formality, because the
buck could be stopped by the formal notion of a reason. Formality was
buck-stopping, and Crisp’s objection seemed vindicated. However, in
order to clarify the relationship between reasons and values, and formal
and substantive properties, we presented an augmented buck-passing
account of reasons and values in which substantive considerations and
evaluative attitudes count in favour of first-order properties, and the
notions both of a reason and of goodness and value are formal higher-
order ones. This establishes the plausibility of the formal/substantive
distinction required for buck-passing. We saw that in Scanlon’s original
argument, the formal/substantive distinction was not applied properly
to the relationship between reasons and value. However, applied
correctly, the formal/substantive distinction is able to support the
essence of the buck-passing argument that formal properties cannot
stop the buck.
On the augmented buck-passing view, the formality of the properties
of reasons and value refers to the relationship of counting in
favour between substantive considerations, evaluative attitudes and
substantive properties of objects. These properties are formal because
they refer neither to the substantive properties of the objects nor to the
content of the evaluative attitudes or reasons. The explanation ‘I went
to the beach because there was a reason and an evaluation counting
in favour’ is incomplete, because it does not refer to the substantive
properties that provide the content for the reasons and attitudes. It
is not tautologous, but it is formal because it omits reference to the
substantive properties of the considerations, attitudes and objects.
Rather, it refers only to the relationship of counting in favour that exists
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between reasons, evaluative attitudes and the substantive properties
of objects.
Crisp is certainly correct that both general and specific explanations
can be buck-stopping. But both general and specific explanations are
substantive in virtue of their reference to the substantive properties of
objects and the substantive content of reasons and evaluative attitudes
in their favour. Crisp’s criticism seems based on a conflation of the
distinction between formal and general. This conflation was justified
given Scanlon’s own conflation in his notion of a reason on his original
view. However, on the augmented buck-passing argument presented
here, the distinction between the formal and general is clarified. It
is shown that a buck-passing account must maintain consistently
the buck-passing nature of formal properties and the buck-stopping
nature of substantive properties, and apply them across both reasons
and values. Once the relationship between substantive and formal
properties is clarified in the augmented buck-passing account, we
can see more readily why the buck must be passed from both the
formal properties of reasons and values to the substantive properties
of considerations, evaluations and the objects in which they count in
favour. Indeed, on each of the examples used by Crisp, the buck is
stopped by a substantive property (whether general or specific). This
indicates that an explanation of the considerations (and evaluative
attitudes) in favour of objects must include reference to substantive
properties. A purely formal explanation omits this necessary element.
A purely formal answer to the question ‘why did you visit the beach’
such as ‘I visited the beach because there was a reason and an
evaluative attitude counting in its favour’, absent reference to any
substantive properties, refers to the counting in favour of relationship
between considerations, evaluative attitudes and properties of objects.
The augmented buck-passing claim is that a reason and an evaluative
attitude in favour of an object cannot be provided by any property that
does not include any substantive content to the reasons and evaluative
attitudes in an object’s favour. Thus, to say that Yarmouth is a good
resort is not to say nothing. It says that there is a consideration and an
evaluative attitude that counts in its favour. But to say that Yarmouth
is a good resort is not to say anything that give us a specific or general
substantive reason or evaluation in its favour. The formal properties
of a reason and goodness are without substantive content; they simply
refer to the relationship of counting in favour between considerations,
evaluative attitudes and objects. Without substantive content there
is no basis for any particular reason or attitude. Without substantive
reasons and attitudes, there is no basis to why and how persons are to
relate to particular objects positively. Without an account of why and
how persons are to relate to particular objects positively, we must pass
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the buck of relating to objects positively to properties that can provide
this account. The purely formal properties of a reason and goodness
cannot stop the buck in virtue of their formality. They cannot stop the
buck because they omit the buck-stopping substantive properties of
reasons, evaluative attitudes and the objects they count in favour of.
On each of Crisp’s examples employed in his objections, the buck is
stopped by substantive properties.
The goal of this augmented buck-passing account has been to respond
to Crisp’s reasons and the good objection, by clarifying the nature of
the relationship between formal and substantive properties, general
and specific properties, the normative and the evaluative, and practical
reasons and evaluative attitudes. However, whilst the augmented buck-
passing argument may clarify certain of these relationships and provide
a response to the important criticism levelled by Crisp, we should note
two remaining problems for buck-passers.
5. PROPERTIES AND THE AUGMENTED
BUCK-PASSING ACCOUNT
In the preceding sections, I have defended Scanlon’s buck-passing
account of value. We saw that the buck-passing account of value
faced two main criticisms: the wrong kind of reasons criticism; and
the reasons and the good criticism. I presented arguments to show
that these criticisms could be met, and augmented the buck-passing
account to improve its internal coherence. Whilst I have argued that
the augmented buck-passing account is an improvement on Scanlon’s
original presentation, it seems to me that two significant problems
remain. These problems do not necessarily threaten the validity of the
buck-passing account, but they are important omissions that require
further work in order for the augmented buck-passing account to carry
its weight in argument. I describe these as the constitution problem,
and the determination problem.
a. The Constitution Problem
We recall that my augmented buck-passing account of value described
a relationship between first-order substantive properties of objects and
the reasons and evaluative attitudes that count in their favour. But
what is the relationship between these reasons and evaluative attitudes
and the first-order properties? How are we to explain the relationship
between substantive first-order properties of objects and the reasons
and evaluative attitudes that are related to them? Scanlon states
that the properties of objects constitute these reasons and evaluative
attitudes, and he provides the case of the beach that is pleasant. The
beach has certain properties such as temperature, cleanliness and
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being sunny, and on the buck-passing view these properties provide the
evaluative attitudes and the reasons that then constitute the properties
of right and good. But how does temperature and sunshine constitute
a reason and an evaluative attitude? Scanlon does not provide an
explanation in his buck-passing account, but we do get intimations
in other authors that the relationship may be one of supervenience.13
Supervenience may be a plausible account of the relationship between
the properties of objects and the reasons and evaluative attitudes that
are constituted by them, but this argument requires amplification
and interrogation. I do not suggest the constitution problem is
insurmountable, but it is an important omission that supporters of the
buck-passing account should address in order to enhance the argument.
b. The Determination of Reasons and Evaluative Attitudes
Scanlon presents his buck-passing account of value as part of his wider
theory of what we owe to each other. Our duties to others are prescribed
by the value of right and wrong, and the value of right and wrong is
grounded on certain properties. These properties are principally our
capacity to evaluate and act on reasons, and our commitment to live in
a relationship with others where our actions are justified on terms no
one with similar commitments can reasonably reject. Scanlon wants to
explain why the reasons against wronging have a special importance
and priority in our practical relationships with other persons, and
the buck-passing account of value plays an important part in this
explanation. But it seems to me that the buck-passing account of value,
as currently presented, is ill-equipped to provide Scanlon with the
resources he needs to establish the importance and priority of what
we owe to each other. The buck-passing account, in itself, cannot tell
us which properties have reasons and attitudes that count in favour
of them, and which reasons and attitudes are constituted by these
properties.14
The buck-passing account itself could be informed by an objective
or subjective account of properties and their reasons and values.
An objective account would follow if we could establish that certain
attitudes and reasons attach necessarily to certain objects and that
13 See Pekka Va¨yrynen, ‘Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value’, Oxford Studies
in Metaethics, vol. 1, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford, 2006), p. 301, and Wlodek
Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, ‘The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-
attitudes and Value’, Ethics 114 (2004), p. 407.
14 This determination problem differs from the constitution problem, because the
constitution problem concerns the nature of the relationship between properties and
reasons/attitudes, whereas the determination problem accepts that this general problem
has been accounted for but asks how we distinguish particular reasons and attitudes.
Of course, our answer to the constitution problem may enable us to determine the
reasons/attitudes, but this remains to be seen.
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the objects have a necessary particular nature. Similarly, a subjectivist
account may follow if we allow that the determination of the reasons
and attitudes and even the objects is determined subjectively (these are
just two examples). The augmented buck-passing account is not itself
an account of the objectivity or subjectivity of reasons and values or of
the nature of properties, and so can only be used in addition to such an
account.
A buck-passing account of value must also be augmented with an
account of how we determine the reasons and the evaluative attitudes
that are associated with the properties of objects. As Pekka Va¨yrynen
points out, ‘no sufficiently definite account may be available of what
distinguishes positive responses (“pro-attitudes”) from the negative
ones (“con-attitudes”), and both from responses that are neither’.15
Even if we are able to find a way to determine properties, let us say
on subjective grounds that a particular beach is sunny, how do we
determine the appropriate reasons and evaluative attitudes that are
constituted by these properties and which are essential to the buck-
passing account? Should we visit the beach to exploit its qualities, or
stay away to protect it; should we admire its qualities, or should we
enjoy them? Just as the buck-passing account needs an explanation of
how we determine which properties are the appropriate objects for a
buck-passing account, so we need an explanation of the determination
of the appropriate reasons and attitudes that are derived from the
properties of these objects.
The omission of an account of the constitution of reasons and
evaluations by first-order substantive properties of objects, combined
with the omission of an account of the determination of the properties
and the reasons and values constituted by them, hinders the
augmented buck-passing account’s successful employment in defence
of Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other, and in moral theories more
widely. My purpose has not been to suggest that these accounts are
impossible, but rather to suggest areas on which defenders of buck-
passing should concentrate.
CONCLUSION
I have sought to defend buck-passing from two important criticisms
drawn from Roger Crisp’s work. The wrong kind of reasons criticism has
issued in many attempted defences and criticisms of Scanlon’s buck-
passing argument. I have argued that the most successful defence of
buck-passing is found in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s dual
role of right reasons argument. I argue that this response is successful
15 Va¨yrynen, ‘Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value’, p. 305.
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even where its authors claim it fails. In response to Crisp’s reasons
and the good objection, I argued for a clearer distinction between
formal and general properties, and presented my augmented buck-
passing account in defence of buck-passing. Inspired by Wallace’s
reference to the plausibility of a buck-passing account of reasons in
addition to goodness and value, the augmented buck-passing account
distinguishes between practical reasons as intentional-action-related,
and values as evaluative-attitude-related. It seeks to avoid the notion of
independent reason-giving properties of reasons as well as the notion of
goodness and value. I have suggested that whilst this augmented buck-
passing argument can respond to Crisp’s reasons and the good criticism,
the augmented buck-passing account of reasons and value contains
significant omissions that must be addressed. My aim in this article has
been to identify the weakness in the augmented buck-passing account
as it stands currently, in order to point out where more work should be
done by its supporters. These problems are particularly important for
those who wish to promote Scanlon’s contractualism.
I have alluded to the important role of the buck-passing argument
in Scanlon’s account of what we owe to each other. The buck-passing
argument is important to establishing the nature of the relationship
between reasons, values and properties of objects. These phenomena all
feature centrally in Scanlon’s account of the justification of principles of
right and wrong. However, it seems that Scanlon wishes to explain why
the reasons against wronging have a particular importance and priority
in our relations with other persons, and the buck-passing account must
therefore include an explanation of the properties that feature in this
relationship and why these properties have a particular importance and
priority. This explanation will get to the heart of the status of the moral
reasons and the status of Scanlon’s contractualist account of morality.
The nature of these properties will determine the scope of Scanlon’s
contractualism, and the final status of the reasons against wronging.
The work on addressing these omissions is therefore important to the
success of the wider buck-passing account of reasons and values, and
crucial to Scanlon’s contractualism in particular.
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